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Introduction  
Contemporary theories of art need to take a position regarding globalization; how to 
approach images, texts and sounds from other cultures. The problems art theory faces 
dealing with globalization are parallel with the ones history faces: on the one hand the 
history of other cultures can be seen through the matrix of western history. In this case 
their past is assimilated. The histories of other cultures tend to become variations on the 
master narrative of European history.1 Non-western cultures will turn out to be “figures 
of lack”.2 On the other hand, those other cultures can be perceived as profoundly 
different, only to be understood in their own terms. In this case, cultures are too easily 
seen as essentialist homogeneous wholes.3 Do we understand and judge the artistic 
endeavors of other cultures through the matrix of the western artistic canons and 
standards or “in their own terms”? 
At the end of the 20th century, the intensified confrontation with globalization in general 
and non-western art in particular begged the question: are art and artistic value concepts 
of transhistorical and transcultural significance or are they only referring to a specific 
western phenomenon from the Renaissance onwards? If all non-western artifacts are 
excluded from “arthood” and art is simply equated with post-Renaissance, self-conscious 
artmaking then this, on the one hand, makes a concept with a positive value connotation, 
in the sense that good art is worthwhile, exclusive to Western societies. On the other 
hand, it makes the concept of art highly Eurocentric and thus of limited relevance in a 
globalised world. Beyond that, it is empirically hard to maintain that no other society 
beyond the post Renaissance western society had art.4 In order to identify and judge all 
art, we need a theory of art and artistic value that can accommodate artifacts from all 
cultures and times.  
Most theories of art and artistic value aim to do this. A good example in case is 
formalism. Formalists claim that the essential feature of art is form, and artistic value 
should be judged on that basis.5 Modern art and “primitive” artifacts can be judged 
artistically side by side on the base of decontextualized formal similarity between them.6 
But to see and judge non-western art aesthetically only in the light of formal qualities like 
harmony and unity degrades its specific cultural and social context. In this way, 
formalism appropriates non-western art: it includes non-western art through denying any 
original meaning and exclusively focusing on a particular cultural interest, namely form.7 
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Formalism seems to be able to include “non-canonical” art, but then it is only art to “our” 
standards. The principle of formal similarity confirms the cultural dominance of the West 
rather than it leads to the emancipation the formalists intended.8  
Contextualists, contra formalists, claim all artifacts should be interpreted and judged 
within their own historical and cultural context. There is no transhistorical and 
transcultural essence of art. Contextualizing art can lead to the point where there is no 
common ground to judge all art on. It ends up in a certain brand of relativism where 
validity of artistic judgments is completely connected to its specific context, but can 
never transcend it. It can also lead to “othering”. “Othering” or alienating means making 
non-Western art different, and that often means making it unequal or else disregarding it.9 
This othering, where art is judged along cultural lines, can also have profound 
conservative consequences. First, intended or unintended, western art stays referential: all 
art evaluated as art distinct from “our” tradition is exotic. Second, it can force the non-
West to perform their pure “otherness”.10 It essentializes cultures and cultural recognition 
turns into cultural pressure: members of a culture are not only allowed to perform their 
cultural practices, but obliged to do this.11   
The art theories of Jerrold Levinson and Arthur Danto try to formulate an answer to the 
problems sketched above. Both argue against aesthetic and formalist approaches. They 
claim that aesthetics cannot be part of the definition of art as not all art has aesthetic 
properties.12 Aesthetics cannot account for the difference between art and mere real 
things. This does not mean art has no essence. For Levinson, an object must be intended 
for regard as an artwork. Formal similarity is not enough, as only relatively complete or 
total ways of regarding are to be allowed: not single, isolated ways of regarding.13 
Moreover, an artwork is only correctly regarded in light of its true history of 
production.14 It follows that non-western objects cannot be art due to their formal 
similarity with modern western art. They can be art, but for different reasons. A similar 
view can be found in Danto: “Claiming an affinity is the very opposite of inferential art 
criticism, for it entails no historical explanations at all”.15 It does not follow that Levinson 
and Danto claim there is no art beyond Western post Renaissance art. Both argue an 
artmaker does not need to be conscious of the concept of art. Danto acknowledges that 
the distinction between artifact and art is not lexically marked in the vocabularies of 
African languages generally, but claims that the absence of lexical markers can hardly be 
taken as evidence that the distinction cannot be made or that it is not made in the 
linguistic community in question.16 Levinson accepts the possibility that someone who 
does not know the concept of an artwork can make an artifact that we would have no 
conceptual difficulty regarding it as an artwork.17 
Both theorists make a clear distinction between arthood and artistic value. A definition of 
art must account for all art: good or bad, western or non-western, new or old.18 It does not 
follow that artistic value is relative: Danto regrets the multiculturalist stance where the 
best one could hope to do is to endeavor to understand how those within a given cultural 
tradition appreciated their art. It ends up in a kind of relativism where the concept of 
quality becomes odious and chauvinist and where art criticism becomes a form of cultural 
criticism.19  He argues that a pluralist view on art should not lead to the erasure of the 
distinction between good and bad art. Levinson also makes clear the distinction between 
good and bad art holds and is objective. Contrary to relativist theories, he is trying to 
validate the difference between good and less good art universally. As David Hume, he is 
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seeking a principle to make valid judgements about artistic quality; pronouncing one 
judgment correct and other incorrect.20   
Levinson and Danto both propose a theory of art that can accommodate for all art without 
denying specific historical contexts. But, this does not lead to relativism: their theories try 
to make a valid distinction between art and non-art and good art and bad art universally. 
They both avoid the exclusionary and appropriating traits of formalist definition and 
evaluation, as non-western art is not seen and judged artistically only in the light of 
formal or aesthetic qualities, excluding other cultural and social meanings. On the other 
hand, arthood and artistic value are universal. If art and artistic value are seen as social 
constructs, non-western art can be excluded or appropriated, but cannot be seen as equal. 
On the one hand, it can be excluded as “they” do not have our concept of art. A much 
offered solution by relativists is including them into a newly founded field, namely 
“visual culture.” Art historian Kitty Zijlmans rightly argues the replacement of the term 
“art” by “visual culture” offers no way out: exclusionary concepts of art will not be 
challenged and will remain the point of reference.21 Excluding non-western artifacts from 
artistic judgement is denying the non-west equal judging. On the other hand, relativists 
like Moxey claim that art historians should promote political, historical and social 
agenda’s.22 Including non-western art for political reasons again equals appropriation: the 
original meanings are ignored in function of political aims and non-western art is again 
not equally judged as western art. 
Historicism and Essentialism 
Levinson and Danto both try to identify and understand art within its context without 
throwing out the idea of a transhistorical and transcultural concept of art. They do this 
through combining historicism and essentialism. Both Danto and Levinson underwrite 
the historicity of art. Art is not the same throughout time and space and is historically 
conditioned, but this does not mean it has no universal essence. Is their way out of radical 
essentialism and radical relativism satisfying? They start from the same premises: what it 
meant to be art in the past and what it now means to be art is not the same. We need to 
know the historical context of an artifact to find out whether it is art and to judge it 
artistically. Due to a different view on the philosophy of history, their historical 
approaches are totally different with different outcomes for the evaluation of non-western 
art. Whereas Danto has a teleological view on history; where the history of art fulfills her 
historical mission through her history, Levinson denies the history of art such a goal. 
Levinson puts forward that historicity is the essence of art. Levinson clearly explains: “So 
what I mean by historicism with regard to the concept of art, at least in this context, is 
[…] the conviction that the only common core of art applicable to art-making today and 
two thousand years ago, and to any activities and artifacts of other cultures we recognize 
without strain as evidencing art-making – is one which makes historical reference or 
connectedness, that is, reference or connectedness to predecessor works, activities, modes 
of reception, internal to the idea of art-making itself”.23 An object is art when it is or was 
intended or projected for overall regard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded.24 
This means arthood is dependent on the intended relationship of the object with the 
preceding history of art. As other relational approaches, Levinson defends the separation 
between the tasks of defining and evaluating art.25 It follows that to be art is a “neutral” 
state, and does not imply that it is worthwhile. On the other hand, Levinson makes a clear 
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connection between the way in which art is defined and evaluated. Levinson claims that 
his theory allows concrete standards of evaluation to be derived from criteria of 
membership. Good artworks, Levinson argues, give at least initially similar rewards as 
past good artworks.26 
Danto connects historicism and essentialism differently. Danto argues “As an essentialist 
in philosophy, I am committed to the view that art is eternally the same – that there are 
conditions necessary and sufficient for something to be an artwork, regardless of time and 
place. […] But as an historicist I am also committed to the view that what is a work of art 
at one time cannot be one at another, and in particular that there is a history, enacted 
through the history of art, in which the essence of art – the necessary and sufficient 
conditions – are painfully brought to consciousness”.27 Something is an artwork 
regardless of time and place if it has a subject (i.e., it is about something) about which it 
projects some attitude or point-of-view by means of rhetorical ellipsis which ellipsis, in 
turn, engages audience participation in filling-in what is missing (an operation which can 
also be called interpretation) where the works in question and the interpretations thereof 
require an art-historical context.28 This transhistorical essence in art, everywhere and 
always the same, only discloses itself through history.29 Danto explains that the end and 
fulfillment of the history of art is the philosophical understanding of what art is. He 
parallels this history to the personal history of the individual. Everyone tries to achieve an 
understanding of oneself. We do this through the mistakes we make, the false paths we 
follow and so on. The first false path in art’s history was the close identification of art 
with picturing. The second false path was the materialist formalist aesthetics of 
Greenberg.30 The history of art was over once art itself raised the true form of the 
philosophical question – that is, the question of the difference between artworks and real 
things.31 
Both Levinson and Danto claim to formulate a universal theory of art that can 
accommodate art from all cultures. What does the historical component of their theory 
mean for arthood and artistic value?  Is there a relationship between historical 
significance and artistic value?  
Levinson and historical significance 
For Levinson, both arthood and artistic value are dependent on historical significance. 
The historical significance of an object shows if an object is or is not intentionally related 
to prior art or prior good art. Very important in his view is that historical significance 
makes reference to the past, not to the future. Levinson makes a clear distinction between 
definition and interpretation of art on the one hand and evaluation of art on the other 
hand. Arthood and art content do not change over time. This position is called “traditional 
historicism”.32 “Traditional historicism” is committed to an exclusive role for preceding, 
rather than succeeding, historical context in the generation of an artwork’s central 
content.33 But, Levinson clearly argues, this traditional historicism is only about arthood 
and art content and not about the permanence of artistic value. His “traditional 
historicism” should not lead to any conservatism as to how canons should be 
constituted.34  
Good artworks, Levinson argues, give at least initially similar rewards as past good 
artworks.35 The obvious question is: which past artworks are good? Levinson proposes an 
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answer in a Humean vain. Hume acknowledges that not everyone agrees on artistic 
judgments, but claims that one opinion is objectively superior to other opinions.36 Those 
superior opinions are made by “ideal critics.” These “ideal critics” have a delicacy of 
taste, innate or cultivated, are practiced through frequent contemplation of particular 
species of beauty, compare works of art, lack prejudice and have a good sense.37 Hume’s 
approach has been charged with circularity: how can we find out whether someone is an 
ideal judge? Critics of Hume argue that it is impossible to find the good critics unless you 
already know the good artworks.38 Levinson tries to defend Hume’s account of artistic 
value against circularity by pointing out that of some artworks we actually know they are 
good. “ […]Works standing the test of time, paradigms of excellence in art, constitute the 
standard of taste in a given art form: there are no rules of composition with general 
application to be found: and true critics are not individuals who have grasped such 
nonexistent rules, but rather ones who are attuned to greatness in art and suited to 
identifying and explicating such for us”.39  
How does he rhyme this idea of a collection of untouchable artworks with the fact that his 
theory does not aim at permanence of artistic value? Here he clearly advocates that in 
specific cases artistic permanence is objective. Though there are certainly artworks of 
very high quality we can still artistically appreciate, this is no reason to give these works 
a separate status of “untouchable” objective artistic quality. Why would anyone even 
consider re-evaluating them? If a new judge would feel there is a lack somewhere, he or 
she will not be seen as an ideal judge anymore. This makes an open encounter with these 
masterworks impossible. Moreover, the idea that some artworks’ quality is beyond 
discussion, leads to another problem pointed out by art historian Anna Brzyski. Not only 
judges are limited by making artworks’ quality untouchable, in other words, canonical. 
Artists themselves, well trained in art history, will consciously or unconsciously try to 
connect their artistic output to these canonical works of the history of art.40 
A related problem, a problem Levinson touches himself, is that some artworks have been 
excluded from being artistically judged, not because they are not art, but because of 
political or social reasons.41 Although they might be as old as the masterpieces, they 
cannot be seen as masterpieces as they did not stand the test of time. Only now, people 
began to judge them artistically. Levinson claims that he never proposed the test of time 
as a criterion of artistic value, but only as an important, yet entirely defeatable, indicator 
therefore. The test of time is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition: failing the test of 
time is not necessarily the fault of those works.42 When the “objective good works” are 
the ones that have stood the test of time, they are “referential works” and will form a 
canon, but the works that did not stand the test of time will have to wait before they 
actually do stand that test. When the referential works stay the same, this will not easily 
happen. Levinson does not seem to acknowledge that through clinging to the idea that 
masterpieces are objectively so because they stood the test of time, he is in fact giving 
them a special status, unreachable for other artworks because of social, political or 
cultural reasons.  
Danto and historical significance 
For Danto arthood is not dependent on the object’s historical significance, but the 
meaning of a work is. Danto’s whole theory revolves around the problem of 
indiscernibles. His main point is that two indiscernible objects do not necessarily have the 
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same object status. One can be an artwork, while the other is not or they could both be 
artworks, but with totally different artistic meanings. The true status and meaning of an 
object is dependent on the historical context. So far, there is a clear parallel between 
Levinson’s and Danto’s theory.  
Art, in Danto’s view, has historical significance when it brought the history of art closer 
to its goal. The goal of art history or in Danto’s words “what art want,” is the 
philosophical understanding of what art is. This goal is achieved through a history of 
mistakes and false paths. Within this history of art, every mistake and false path was 
historically significant as it would eventually lead to the fulfillment of the ultimate goal 
of art history. Once, Danto explains, art itself raised the true form of the philosophical 
question – that is, the question of the difference between artworks and real things – 
history was over.43 The master narrative of the history of art is that there is an era of 
imitation, followed by our post-historical era in which, with qualification, anything 
goes.44 
The question of the difference between artworks and real things was formulated by Andy 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. There, the point had been reached when art and reality were 
indiscernible.45 Danto argues it was the historical mission of art to make philosophy 
possible, after which art has no historical mission in the great cosmo-historical sweep. 
The fulfillment of the history of art is the philosophy of art.46 That the history of art has 
ended does not mean the practices of art will not continue. They simply go on existing 
without a goal. Art is now in a post-historical era and its activities no longer have any 
historical significance.47 The end of the progressive historical narrative is a liberating 
idea, according to Danto. It liberated artists from the task of making more history, from 
having to follow the “correct historical line”.48  Historical significance ceased to be a 
factor in art criticism as no art is no longer licit.49 The post-historical era of art is an era 
of pluralism. The arts are liberated, having handed the problem of the nature of art over to 
philosophy, to do what they wanted to, and at this precise historical moment Pluralism 
became the objective historical truth.50  
Why would philosophy be the historical reason for art? Art historian and philosopher 
David Carrier states “Why confine art to the task of self-definition, to the quest to 
determine what art is? Even if Brillo Box definitely demonstrates the falsity of the 
modernist analysis, it does not follow that in the future, art cannot undertake yet now 
unknowable quests”.51 Danto’s idea of one unique historical reason for art follows from 
his view on narratives. Danto does not see a historical narrative as one possible way to 
tell a history; historical narratives are not just what historians construct. The end of art 
history as he identifies it, is not merely the end of one narrative, it is the end of this actual 
sequence of events in the world’s history. After the End of Art describes the nature of art, 
not just one way of telling art’s history.52 Danto is committed to narrativism de re – the 
belief that the history of art itself is narratively structured. Its having an end depends, 
then, not on Danto’s goals but on its own goals.53 Danto states: “It will be clear that, for 
me, a narrative is something actually lived, something realized in and as history, rather 
than […] merely the way historians organize event”.54 Danto claims that after the end of 
art, art is freed from art historical and philosophical imperatives. But this liberation is 
only possible through stripping away the possibility for art to set her own historical goals. 
The philosophy of art assures its own historical significance by being the discipline 
which defines art as having no historical significance.55  
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He “projects” this narrative in all art before the end of art. He elevates Warhol’s Brillo 
Boxes to the resolution of the historical mission of art history, but he also denies the 
artwork other meanings it obviously has. Danto construes modernism in terms of a single 
progressive developmental history, oriented towards some recognizable goal or telos. 
Ironically, he is construing modernism exclusively in terms of categories taken up from 
Greenberg. In this way Danto, just as Greenberg, fails to do justice to other developments 
in twentieth-century art, such as Russian Constructivism, Dada and Surrealism.56 As in 
historical times there was a correct historical line, art that was not “historically 
mandated” is excluded: surrealism, for example, did not move forward the (false) 
Greenbergian narrative. In the end, his theory is just as exclusionary as Greenberg’s 
except that Danto shows a way to recuperate historically insignificant art, as after the end 
of art, historical significance lost all meaning for art criticism. In this way, it seems to be 
nondiscriminatory: after the end of art every artwork deserves “equal judging”. Still, all 
art beyond the pale of history will never be able to participate in history and as such did 
not help to attain its goal. Not being able to participate in the historical mission of art, 
diminishes the value of these “historically insignificant” artworks. Danto himself draws 
the parallel between the end of the history of art and endings of movies where people live 
happily ever after. The point is that the story of people living happily ever after will not 
be told, it is excluded from the movie. Formulating one historical goal for art, is denying 
all art that falls outside this history of participation in this history and of setting its own 
historical goals.  
Both Danto and Levinson agree that one needs to know the historical context in order to 
know whether an objects is art or not. But historical significance or meaning is a 
completely different notion for them. For Levinson, to be part of the history of art means 
there is a specific intentional historical link between an object and past art objects. Danto, 
on the other hand, grants historical significance to art objects when they moved the 
history of art closer towards the resolution of the historical mission of art. It follows that 
for Levinson an object that is without historical significance is necessarily not art and an 
artwork that does not give related rewards as past good artworks is not a good artwork. 
An object can only be art and be valuable as art within the context of history. History for 
Danto is Hegelian history: history moves towards a goal. Artworks can fall beyond the 
pale of history: they are art, but did not participate in the history of art. For Levinson, 
history is without a telos or a goal. The study of history is simply the study of the past. 
For Danto art history had a goal and this goal has been attained, so the history of art is 
over.  
For understanding an object in its historical context, Levinson sticks to “surface 
interpretation”. Past intentions and correct regards are in most cases suggested by the 
outward face of the object, its context of creation, the process by which it came about and 
the genre it appears to belong to. In cases of doubt, Levinson argues, people can be 
queried, journals consulted, etcetera.57 Surface interpretation must be scrupulously 
historical, and refers only to possibilities the maker or artist could have acknowledged 
without attributing to him knowledge of the human sciences of the future.58 Danto claims 
that surface interpretation is needed, in order to come to a deep interpretation of the 
object. A deep interpretation is one that is hidden from the one that is being interpreted.59 
Danto’s end of the history of art is a form of deep interpretation. Every artist who has 
contributed to the historical mission of art, is not aware of this. Only afterwards, one can 
interpret artworks in this way and put them together in this master narrative. In 
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Levinson’s view, the history of art cannot end when art is still being made. The history of 
art is the narrative of objects that are related through historical intentions, but this 
narrative lacks a hidden structure or mission. 
They both have an unproblematic view on the objectivity of history: Levinson has no 
difficulty accepting that the intentions of art makers can be discovered and “correct 
regards” can be revealed and used in his definition of art.  Danto claims that the narrative 
he tells in not constructed by him, but has actually been lived that way. Levinson also 
claims that the history of art is not just a possible construction and as such cannot be 
rewritten: “my view that art is now an almost purely historical notion should least of all 
be thought to license the idea that we change, through interpretive reflection or 
construction in the present, what the history of art has been”.60 In both theories, the 
“historical significance” of an object is fixed, from the moment it is correctly interpreted. 
Exclusion, Appropriation and Othering 
What are the consequences for the evaluation of non-western art of both art theories? 
Levinson insists that if another culture has art, it must be art in our sense more or less.61 
The obvious question is: what is art in our sense? What is art now and what has been art 
in the past is historically contingent to Levinson; the arthood of an object cannot be 
determined by its characteristics. How can non-western art be related to what art is in our 
sense? Levinson offers two solutions to this problem. One strategy for assimilating to the 
intentional-historical conception of art phenomena outside the purview of Western fine 
art, Levinson argues, is to take the concrete totality of art regards that have accumulated 
in three thousand years or so of our common culture, all those relatively replete regards 
intending an object for which – or against which, in the case of revolutionary art – 
qualifies it as art, and seek to locate them in operation in those other domains, e.g., that of 
handmade furniture, or sculpted masks, or commercial design, or ritual music, or baton-
twirling.62 The other, weaker, strategy for assimilating non-paradigm art phenomena to 
the intentional-historical picture, Levinson goes on, is to attempt to identify in other 
domains simply the same structure of connectedness, of intentional invocation, whether 
immediate or mediate, of predecessor objects of the treatments they were accorded. If 
found, this would be some reason for thinking of those other domains as art-like, or as 
containing analogs of art, while perhaps not being strictly art in the particular, 
historicized sense it has acquired in our culture, and in which our culture is, in all its 
concreteness, and for better or worse, ineliminably implicated.63  
Levinson’s first strategy contradicts his traditionalism and historicism. In the context of 
forgery, Levinson claims that an original is correctly regarded only in the light of its true 
history of production, but a forger cannot rationally intend a forgery of same to be 
accorded that regard as such.64 Translated to the situation of non-western or unconscious 
art – such art is granted art status in reference to the concrete totality of art regards that 
have accumulated in three thousand years. But, then this art is not correctly regarded in 
the light of its true history of production. He takes together all possible art regards, while 
as a historicist he claims that not all art regards are valid at the same time and as a 
traditionalist he claims that we can only take into account the art regards that were known 
to the maker. This means this “correct regard” cannot be transplanted in another cultural 
and historical setting. His traditionalist intentionalist historical vision cannot 
accommodate for unconscious art in this way. Moreover, connecting non-western art to 
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the art regards of “our common culture” leads to a form of appropriation in which the 
inclusion of non-western art in the history of art only leads to a reaffirmation of western 
high art and the inferiority of non-western art that was “granted” a place in “our” history 
of art. 
Though in his first article on the definition of art, Levinson starts from the idea that 
unconscious art, is art, he tends to weaken his claims, to it being “artful” or “art-like”.65  
The first question is: what is “art-like”? Levinson claims, it is easy to distinguish the 
purely craft, i.e. the purely functional, from the purely artistic, i.e. the non-functional, 
from the items in-between, not purely craft, and not wholly art.66 Here, he is clearly 
inspired by an aesthetic approach he tries to avoid, namely he uses the dichotomy 
craft/art, functionality/aesthetics. This also seems to imply that Levinson knows what art 
is apart from a specific historical context. Levinson goes on “[…] factors that would 
dispose one to see a craft object as art would include whether it was fashioned by a single 
individual and reflected that individual’s personality and taste, the amount of care evident 
in the handling of detail, the degree of attention to form as part from fittingness to 
function as such, the sense of a statement being made or an attitude expressed. But note 
that these signs, which would dispose us to classify as art, are exactly ones which 
implicate familiar regards that paradigm artworks of the past have been standardly 
accorded”.67  
Objects that are “artful” or “art-like” have a clearly inferior status to “art”. Levinson 
would claim that art is a neutral status, so no value judgement can be deduced from it. 
Still, he also, rightly, claims that in order for something to be judged, we have to know 
what we are dealing with.68 The artistic value of art is then clearly separated from and 
superior to the artistic value of something that is “art-like”. Again, the “uncontested” 
artworks become referential: they are given a special status that puts them higher up in 
the hierarchy. Unconscious art seems art-like when it is not connected to the traditional 
history of art. When it is, as for example Gregorian chants, it is art plain.69 Gregorian 
chants can be related to later uncontested art, whereas a lot of non-western art cannot.   
Danto does not ask for “art” to be “art in our sense”. If in a definition not all art is equally 
art, than this definition fails. Danto claims that what makes an object an artwork is the 
fact that it embodies, as a human action gives embodiment to a thought, something we 
could not form a concept of without the material objects which convey its soul. In this 
sense, the philosophical structure of, for example, African artworks is the same as the 
philosophical structure of artworks in any culture.70 Danto does not need to give 
strategies for assimilating to his conception of art phenomena outside the purview of 
Western fine art.   
Though on the one hand, Danto claims his master narrative of art, namely, his scheme of 
imitation and self definition, has universal validity, on the other hand he acknowledges 
the history of non-western art is very different. In his essay on African art he claims 
resemblance is not an important consideration in African art, it follows that the forms in 
African art are not distortions. If a Western artist, on the other hand, inspired by African 
models, introduces such exaggerated features into his work as he finds in his models, they 
really will be distortions, just because resemblance counts significantly in Western art. 
Danto then rightfully raises that to appreciate African works for their distortion is 
accordingly to fail to appreciate them at all.71 What is problematic, is that he claims the 
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universal history of art and its resolution starts from imitation and ends into self-
consciousness. In this way, African art has no part in this history: it is not excluded from 
arthood and even appreciated in the fullest sense as art, but it is excluded from the master 
narrative of art and in this sense “othered”. 
In the end, both Levinson and Danto exclude non-western art from the center of the 
history of art. For Levinson, most non-western art is called “art-like”. For Danto, all art, 
western or non-western, is art in the fullest sense, but he does exclude non-western art 
from the master narrative of art history.  
 
Conclusion 
In both theories the traditional Western art historical canon plays a much more important 
role than acknowledged. For identification of art and artistic value, Levinson resorts to 
the connection of uncertain cases to undeniable cases of art or good art. It is not clear at 
what point artworks turn into “uncontested” artworks. He clings to the idea of artworks 
and good artworks that have passed the test of time, but he does not acknowledge that 
this special status has major consequences for the identification of art and artistic value of 
non-western artifacts and other marginalized cases. What was art and artistic value in the 
past cannot be the sole ground for defining art status and artistic value. The consequences 
for non-western art is that it is inferior art or not art at all.  
 For Danto, almost only Western art had historical significance: all art is art, but only 
Western canonical art has contributed to the historical mission of art. On the one hand, he 
appropriates art as he projects it onto his historical scheme and denies artworks meanings 
that do not fit into the narrative. On the other hand, he “others” and excludes non-western 
art in the sense that he excludes them, not from art, but from the history of art. Levinson’s 
non-teleological view makes sure he grants “history” to non-western art.  
They both have an unproblematic view on the objectivity of history: Danto claims that 
the narrative he tells in not constructed by him, but has actually been lived that way. 
Levinson also stresses that the history of art is not just a possible construction and as such 
cannot be rewritten. Their purely objective view on history leads to cultural exclusion. 
Levinson cannot connect non-western art to the history of art in the fullest sense, as he 
clings to the idea that the true narrative of art history is the one where the West is 
implied.72 This is why he has to resort to the notions of “artful” or “artlike”.  Danto 
cannot allow that there are other narratives besides the one he has laid down, he cannot 
grant non-western art historical significance. 
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